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Abstract—Despite the several advantages commonly attributed to social networks such as easiness and immediacy to
communicate with acquaintances and friends, significant privacy threats provoked by unexperienced or even irresponsible users
recklessly publishing sensitive material are also noticeable. Yet, a different, but equally significant privacy risk might arise from
social networks profiling the online activity of their users based on the timestamp of the interactions between the former and the
latter. In order to thwart this last type of commonly neglected attacks, this paper proposes an optimized deferral mechanism for
messages in online social networks. Such solution suggests intelligently delaying certain messages posted by end users in social
networks in a way that the observed online-activity profile generated by the attacker does not reveal any time-based sensitive
information, while preserving the usability of the system. Experimental results as well as a proposed architecture implementing
this approach demonstrate the suitability and feasibility of our mechanism.
Index Terms—Time-based profiling, online social networks, privacy-enhancing technology, Shannon’s entropy, privacy-utility
trade-off.
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1 INTRODUCTION
INFORMATION and communication technologies(ICT) have revolutionized our lives, leading to an
unprecedented societal transformation aimed to reach
the so called “digital era”. In that sense, we are
witnessing today how social networks are paving the
way to reach such transformation by influencing and
even modifying the way we interact with each other
and behave amongst us. Amid the plethora of advan-
tages brought by social networks we find the easiness
to communicate with friends and acquaintances, the
easiness to share thoughts, opinions and experiences
in any format (plain text, pictures, audio, video, etc.)
and even the immediate reaction in case of emergency
or catastrophe.
Yet, despite their proven convenience, online social
networks might also pose serious privacy risks [1],
most of the times due to irresponsible or unexpe-
rienced users who recklessly post private or sensi-
tive information exposing themselves (and sometimes
maybe even their friends and connections in the social
network) [2], [3] to undesired and unexpected situa-
tions (bullying, bribery, identity theft, etc.) [4], [5].
Likewise, an equally significant privacy threat in-
herent to social networks might also become a burden
to the constant increase of their wide deployment and
acceptance. However, unlike the previous one, such
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threat is not based on the content itself published
by the end users and, therefore, it might not be as
evident as the aforementioned one. Whenever we
interact with any social network (post a comment on
Facebook, write a message in Twitter, etc.), regardless
of the content associated with such interaction, it
is reasonably easy for the social network to log a
timestamp stating the instant when the interaction
occurred. By doing so, the social network is able to
build, almost effortlessly, an activity profile of its users
based on the timestamps of each of the interactions
conducted by such users within the social network.
Profiling users based on their online activity
prompts non-negligible privacy concerns. Some ex-
amples that illustrate the kind of information that
could be inferred from an activity profile include, for
instance: when a user normally wakes up and goes to
bed, whether a user is unemployed or not, whether
they are single or married, and whether they are on
holidays or not.
The disclosure of the timing of a message clearly
heightens the risk of privacy when considered in the
context of additional information obtainable from a
user. In combination with geotagging and considering
also the contents of the message posted, accurate tim-
ing may reveal accurate behavioral patterns, in terms
of when and for how long a particular individual does
what, and whether these patterns exhibit a particular
trend over time. When timing is added to the wealth
of data shared across numerous information services,
which a privacy attacker could observe and cross-
reference, such attacker may more easily infer, even if
in a statistical sense, circumstances and trends affect-
ing sensitive aspects of an individual’s life, including
2health status, religious beliefs, social relationships or
work performance.
Of special relevance are also the inferences that an
attacker may draw when certain background knowl-
edge (e.g., cultural and religious patterns and habits)
is available to them. For example, a recent report [6]
indicates that, during Ramadan, Facebook and Twitter
users in the Middle East are in general most active
after iftar time. In both social networks, however,
significant differences are observed depending on
the country. For instance, Qatar and the Emirates
reach peaks of activity just after the iftar, while other
countries like Saudi Arabia are most active around
midnight1. In short, based on this information, the
type of attack explored here could undoubtedly help
an adversary to ascertain whether a user is Muslim
or not, and thus it could seriously compromise their
privacy.
With the purpose of thwarting profiling attacks
based on the posting times, the paper at hand inves-
tigates a data disturbance approach in the form of an
optimized message-deferral mechanism. The mecha-
nism under study enables users to delay a number of
their messages (without loss of generality, interactions
with social networks), hindering an attacker in its
efforts to compromise their privacy from their activity
profiles. The adversary model assumed in this paper
considers an attacker who, based on those profiles,
strives to target peculiar users, or said otherwise,
users who deviate from the typical, common behavior.
When a user adheres to our mechanism, the profile
observed by such attacker (which in our case, as we
will see later, is not limited to the social networking
site, but broadened to any entity able to collect such
timing information), differs from the original, genuine
user profile of online activity in such a way that it
appears to be much more common and therefore less
valuable to the adversary.
The paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 ana-
lyzes general privacy risks and attacks affecting social
networks, and examines several privacy-enhancing
technologies (PETs) that may help counter time-based
profiling attacks. Our optimized deferral mechanism
is introduced and described in Sec. 3, while Sec. 4
specifies the building blocks of an architecture im-
plementing our solution. In turn, Sec. 5 studies two
specific utility metrics for our approach, namely, ex-
pected message delay and messages storage capacity.
A comprehensive set of experiments demonstrating
the feasibility of our proposal has been conducted
and its outcomes are shown in Sec. 6. Finally, Sec. 7
underlines some concluding remarks as well as future
research directions.
1. Aggregated Facebook and Twitter activity profiles are shown
in [7] per country, during and before Ramadan.
2 STATE OF THE ART
In this section, we briefly explore general privacy risks
and attacks that may occur in online social networks.
Then, we review several PETs that could be used
to cope with the specific time-based profiling attacks
illustrated in the previous section.
2.1 Privacy Risks and Attacks in Social Networks
A traditional view on privacy risks and attacks em-
anates from vulnerabilities in systems presumably
protecting confidential data by means of access con-
trol policies. These systems may resort to crypto-
graphic protocols implementing services of authen-
tication, access control, confidentiality, and integrity,
indispensable when the data to be protected flows
across an open medium. A great deal of the vastly
abundant literature on cybersecurity concerns such
type of traditional security and privacy risks.
Online social networks, a modern, widely popu-
lar repository for a wealth of personal, potentially
sensitive data, are clearly subject to most forms of
traditional risks and attacks, as any other online in-
formation system would. Somewhat less obvious is
the fact that the particular nature of social networks
exposes them to a number of privacy vulnerabilities
distinctive of this particular type of online service. In
order to better outline the context of the work pre-
sented here, in the following, we would like to make
a succinct digression on privacy risks and attacks that
affect online social networks due to their specific na-
ture, beyond traditionally well-known vulnerabilities
universally common to information systems.
Whether those vulnerabilities constitute glaring
risks inherent to the mode of operation of the net-
work, or require considerable effort on behalf of an
attacker, is often a matter of the level of sophistication
of the attack, and the various resources available to
the attacker. The quantity and quality of the effort
required by an attack is an important pragmatic ques-
tion addressed in the assumptions adopted in the
following descriptions, whose details can be found in
the accompanying references.
A fundamental category of privacy attacks distinc-
tively directed against social networks draws upon
the principle of identity theft. By impersonating a user,
an attacker may establish online (friendship) relation-
ships with known registered contacts, in order to gain
access to confidential information otherwise restricted
to related peers. That information may be about the
impersonated user or their contacts. Two variations
of this attack are studied in [8], with various degrees
of sophistication, possibly involving profile cloning,
potentially aggravated by means of automated crawling
through the online social network, or even across sites,
and the automated breaking of CAPTCHA codes. The
authors offer empirical evidence of the plausibility
3of these attacks in Facebook, StudiVZ, MeinVZ and
XING.
Another class of attacks, related to the previous
category on identity theft, involves Sybil attacks [9].
In the context of peer-to-peer networks, and other
community-based online systems, a Sybil attack is an
attack wherein a user forges a large number of identi-
ties, in order to subvert the underlying trust model or
reputation system, and thus gain a disproportionately
large influence.
These attacks are relevant in online social networks
because they effectively constitute collaborative rec-
ommender systems relying on user content ratings,
often implemented by means of “like” and “dislike”
annotations. Hence, malicious Sybil attackers may
outvote honest users in order to alter the suggested
relevance of content to better conform with their
personal interests, possibly affecting the popularity
and reputation of other members of the social net-
work. Mechanisms conceived to counter Sybil attacks
in online social networks are explored, for instance,
in [10], [11]. The main countermeasure allows the
forgery of many identities, but precludes the creation
of excessive trust relationships.
A final example of types of privacy attacks specific
to online social network encompasses those referred
to as neighborhood attacks [12], [13]. Under the usual
model of an online social network as a graph, with
vertices representing users, and edges representing
relationships among them, we concordantly define
the (1-)neighborhood of an individual as the induced
subgraph consisting of all immediately adjacent ver-
tices. Even if the identities of the individuals in the
overall graph were purposefully hidden, an attacker
with knowledge of the neighborhood subgraph of a
known user could still attempt to match the sub-
graph structure and successfully reidentify the user
in question, thus violating the supposed anonymity.
Moreover, if several users were reidentified in this
manner, knowledge of the anonymized graph would
enable this attacker to infer possible direct relation-
ships between them, relationships that may also be
construed as confidential information. Strategies to
mitigate the effect of those attacks are the subject of
the aforementioned work [12], [13].
2.2 Privacy-Enhancing Technologies against
Time-based Profiling Attacks
To the best of our knowledge, there is no privacy-
enhancing mechanism specifically conceived to counter
the time-based profiling attack introduced in Sec. 1. In
this section, we review some general-purpose tech-
nologies that might be adopted to tackle this kind
of attacks. Partly inspired by [14], we classify these
technologies into three categories: encryption-based
methods, approaches based on trusted third parties
(TTPs) and data-perturbative techniques.
In traditional approaches to privacy, users or de-
signers decide whether certain sensitive information
is to be made available or not. On the one hand, the
availability of this data enables certain functionality,
e.g., sharing pictures with friends on a social network.
On the other hand, its unavailability, traditionally
attained by means of access control or encryption,
produces the highest level of privacy. In the scenario
considered in this work, the use of encryption-based
techniques could limit access to the content of the
messages posted on a social network, by providing or
not a cryptographic key permitting their deciphering.
Nevertheless, even though this key was not provided,
an attacker with access to the encrypted messages
could still be able to jeopardize user privacy — en-
cryption may conceal the content of such messages,
but it cannot hide the time instants when they were
posted.
A conceptually-simple approach to protect user
privacy consists in a TTP acting as an intermediary
or anonymizer between the user and an untrusted
information system. In this scenario, the system can-
not know the user ID, but merely the identity of
the TTP itself involved in the communication. Al-
ternatively, the TTP may act as a pseudonymizer by
supplying a pseudonym ID’ to the service provider,
but only the TTP knows the correspondence between
the pseudonym ID’ and the actual user ID. In online
social networks, the use of either approach would
be unappropriated as users of these networks are
required to be logged in. Although the adoption of
TTPs to this end would therefore be ruled out, users
themselves could provide a pseudonym at the sign-
up process, thus playing the role of a pseudonymizer.
In this line, some sites have started offering social-
networking services where users are not required to
reveal their real identifiers2.
Unfortunately, none of these approaches may pre-
vent an attacker from profiling a user based on mes-
sage content, and ultimately inferring their real iden-
tity. In its simplest form, reidentification is possible
due to the personally identifiable information often in-
cluded in the messages posted. However, even though
no identifying information is included, pseudonyms
could also be insufficient to protect both anonymity
and privacy. As an example, suppose that an observer
has access to certain behavioral patterns of online
activity associated with a user, who occasionally dis-
closes their ID, possibly during interactions not in-
volving sensitive data. The same user could attempt to
hide under a pseudonym ID’ to exchange information
of confidential nature. Nevertheless, if the user ex-
hibited similar behavioral patterns, the unlinkability
between ID and ID’ could be compromised through
these similar patterns. In this case, any past profiling
2. SocialNumber (http://www.socialnumber.com) is an example
of such networks, where users must choose a unique number as
identifier.
4inferences carried out for the pseudonym ID’ would
be linked to the actual user ID.
Another class of PETs relying on trusted enti-
ties is anonymous-communication systems (ACSs).
In anonymous communications, one of the goals is
to conceal who talks to whom against an adversary
who observes the inputs and outputs of the anony-
mous communication channel. Mix systems [15], [16],
[17] are a basic building block for implementing
anonymous-communication channels. These systems
perform cryptographic operations on messages such
that it is not possible to correlate their inputs and
outputs based on their bit patterns. In addition, mixes
delay and reorder messages to hinder the linking of
inputs and outputs based on timing information.
In the context of our work, ACSs may hide the
link between social networking sites and users, and
therefore may protect user privacy against the in-
termediary entities enabling the communications be-
tween them. We may distinguish between two cases
— the case where messages are public, and the case
where messages are kept private or available to au-
thorized users. In the former case, ACSs obviously
cannot provide any privacy guarantees, as user online
activity is publicly available. In the latter case, the
use of anonymous communications might contribute
to privacy enhancement provided that the attacker is
not the social-networking site3.
Among a variety of privacy and threat models that
have been proposed for ACSs [18], [19], [20], [21],
[22], the important case when the adversary knows
all the senders (inputs) and receivers (outputs) would
render the anonymous system useless under the time-
based profiling attack at hand: it would be enough for
this adversary to observe the messages generated by
the target user. In other words, under the assumption
of an external and global attacker [20], [23], an ACS
would not be an appropriate approach to thwart an
adversary who strives to profile users based on their
online activity.
An alternative to hinder an attacker in its efforts
to profile users consists in perturbing the information
they disclose when communicating with an informa-
tion system. The submission of false data, together
with the user’s genuine data, is an illustrative exam-
ple of data-perturbative mechanism. In the context of
information retrieval, query forgery [24] prevents pri-
vacy attackers from profiling users accurately based
on the content of queries, without having to trust
neither the service provider nor the network opera-
tor, but obviously at the cost of traffic overhead. A
software implementation of query forgery is the Web
browser add-on TrackMeNot [25]. This popular add-
on exploits RSS feeds and other sources of information
to extract keywords, which are then used to generate
3. Clearly, if the attacker was the social networking platform, any
information disclosed by the user would be known to the adversary.
false queries. The add-on gives users the option to
choose how to forward such queries. In particular, a
user may send bursts of bogus queries, thus mimick-
ing the way people search, or may submit them at
predefined intervals of time.
Clearly, the perturbation of user profiles for privacy
protection may be carried out not only by means of
the insertion of bogus activity, but also by suppres-
sion. An example of this latter kind of perturbation
may be found in [26], [27], where the authors propose
the elimination of tags as a privacy-enhancing strat-
egy in collaborative-tagging applications. Tag sup-
pression allows users to enhance their privacy to a
certain degree, but it comes at the expense of degrad-
ing the semantic functionality of those applications,
as tags have the purpose of associating meaning with
resources.
The data-perturbative mechanisms described above
aim to prevent an attacker from profiling users based
on their interests. Although these mechanisms could
also be used to avoid profiling attacks based on the
time instants when users communicate through social
networks, we believe that they would not be adopted
in practice — users of social networks would be
reticent to eliminate their comments and to generate
fake comments, as these actions would have a signifi-
cant impact on the information-exchange functionality
provided by social networks.
3 PRIVACY PROTECTION VIA MESSAGE DE-
FERRAL
This section presents the deferral of messages as a
PET. The description of this technology is prefaced
by a short illustration of time-based profiling attacks
in social networks (including a brief explanatory use
case), and followed by a succinct introduction of the
concepts of soft privacy and hard privacy. Afterwards,
we propose a model for representing user activity and
describe the assumptions about the privacy attacker
assumed in this work. Finally, we define a quantifiable
measure of privacy and utility, and present a formu-
lation of the trade-off between these two aspects.
3.1 Illustration of Time-based Profiling Attacks in
Online Social Networks
The disclosure of the timing activity of a user may
prompt serious privacy concerns, especially when this
information is considered in combination with addi-
tional data about them. Together with location tagging
and the content of the posted messages themselves,
the exposure of precise timing activity may uncover
behavioral patterns from which a privacy attacker
might learn when and for how long a particular
individual does what, and where, and whether these
patterns show a particular trend over time. When
said timing information is added to the data avail-
able at other online services such as search engines,
5multimedia sharing platforms and e-mail, an attacker
that might cross-reference this information may find
it easy to ascertain situations and trends affecting
several sensitive aspects of a person, including, for
example, health status, financial situation, social rela-
tionships, work performance, or changes in political
preferences. The following use case illustrates the
kind of inferences and privacy threats that the sole
disclosure of timing information may cause.
3.1.1 Use case: Inference of Religious Beliefs
Isabella Kaya, a student originally from Turkey, has
just finished her M.S. degree at the School of Law,
University of Texas. Since she was a teenager, our
fictional character has been registered with the most
popular social networks. Generally she is quite active.
In her Twitter and Instagram profiles, her followers
can find pictures of her dog and, more recently, com-
ments and congratulations for her graduation. During
the Ramadan month, however, her behavior in the
networks is altered: Isabella is Muslim and during
that period of time, her online activity is notably
increased at noon. Due to the fast, she has clearly more
opportunities to log into the social networks at that
time of the day.
A couple of months ago, Isabella applied for a
position in a prestigious law firm. The Department
of Human Resources of this firm, similarly to many
other companies, often uses social networks to get
a glimpse of the candidate outside the confines of
a CV, cover letter and interview. Although Isabella
posts around 20 messages a day and is aware that
firms might snoop on them, she is not worried about
a possible invasion of her privacy: she is very reserved
and respectful with her comments, and does not have
any compromising pictures or nothing blameworthy
in her more than 8 years of activity. However, she
keeps a constant eye on the comments that others may
publish in her profile. Now that she is looking for a
job, this control is even stricter.
Isabella had an interview yesterday. Although ev-
erything went smoothly, she was surprised by the
excessive interest of the interviewer in the origin
of her surname. Because she had heard of a few
cases of discriminatory practices against the Muslim
community by this company, she merely responded
her surname was European so as not to reduce her
chances of getting the position.
Not satisfied with the response, the interviewer’s
curiosity could lead him, in a hypothetical case, to
examine her profiles in the social networks. Although
he would not find any comment that might uncover
her religious beliefs, again hypothetically he could
confirm his intuition by conducting a basic search
on her publicly available social-network profiles. In
particular, he could notice that exactly from 18 June to
17 July (period of the last Ramadan) Isabella’s online
activity follows a distinct, characteristic pattern, and
observe that this same behavior is exhibited precisely
during the Ramadan month of the previous year (from
29 June to 28 July), and the one from two years ago
(from 9 July to 8 August), and so it goes on for the
last 8 years of activity, all available at her public
Twitter and Facebook accounts. Also hypothetically,
this could be the reason why she did not get the job
in the end.
3.2 Soft Privacy and Hard Privacy
The privacy research literature [28] recognizes the
distinction between the concepts of soft privacy and
hard privacy. In a soft-privacy model, users entrust
an external entity or TTP to safeguard their privacy.
That is, users put their trust in an entity which will
hereafter be in charge of protecting their private data.
In the literature, numerous attempts to protect
user privacy have followed the traditional method of
anonymous communications, which is based on the
suppositions of soft privacy. Additional examples of
PETs building on this model are anonymizers and
pseudonymizers. The main drawbacks of all these
technologies, as we commented in Sec. 2, are that
they come at the cost of infrastructure and are not
completely effective [29], [30], [31], [32]. Besides, even
in those cases where we could fully trust in the
effectiveness of an entity, that entity could be legally
enforced to reveal the information it has access to [33].
The AOL search data scandal [34] is another example
that shows that the trust relationship between users
and TTPs may be broken. In short, whether privacy
is preserved or not under this model depends on the
trustworthiness of the data controller and its capacity
to manage the entrusted data.
On the other extreme is the hard-privacy model,
where users mistrust any communicating entity and
thus endeavor to reveal as little private information as
possible. In the application scenario at hand, hard pri-
vacy means that users need not trust an external entity
such as the social networking provider or the net-
work operator. Mechanisms providing hard-privacy
guarantees primarily rely on data perturbation and
operate on the user side. An archetypal example
is TrackMeNot, a Web browser extension installed
on the user’s machine that aims at perturbing their
Web search profile through the submission of false
queries. As we shall see next, the privacy-preserving
technology proposed here leans on this model.
3.3 Message Deferral
In the introductory section, we emphasized the risk of
profiling based on the time instants when users sub-
mit messages to a social networking site. In particular,
we mentioned that, building on this online behavior,
an adversary could extract an accurate snapshot of
their profiles of activity throughout time and thus
could compromise user privacy.
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approach consisting of the deferral of messages as a
conceptually-simple mechanism that may thwart this
kind of profiling attacks. The proposed mechanism
allows users to delay the submission of certain mes-
sages, by storing them locally and afterwards sending
them to the social-network provider in question. The
application of this mechanism may help users protect
their privacy to a certain extent, at the cost of no
infrastructure, and without having to trust neither the
service provider nor any other external entity. Since
privacy protection takes place exclusively on the user
side, our mechanism contributes to the principle of
data minimization 4 and avoids any potential leakage
by external privacy systems, social-networking sites,
Internet service providers (ISPs), proxies, routers and
other networking entities. In a nutshell, it provides
hard-privacy guarantees, meaning that the protection
offered by the mechanism is robust in the presence of
untrusted or not fully trusted external entities like the
above might be.
Delaying messages may therefore allow certain pri-
vacy protection, but this inevitably comes at the ex-
pense of data-storage capacity and, more importantly,
the utility of the services provided by the online social
network. As an example, consider a user posting
a tweet5 to confirm a meeting this evening. If this
tweet was postponed, the confirmation could arrive
late and, if so, the information-exchange functionality
would be useless. In short, the deferral of messages
poses a trade-off between the contrasting aspects of
privacy on the one hand, and utility on the other.
Fig. 1 shows a conceptual depiction of our mecha-
nism.
In the coming sections, we shall investigate the
deferral of messages as a technique that may preserve
users’ privacy against an attacker who tries to profile
them based on their posting times. Note that this is in
contrast to other types of profiling attacks that exploit
the content of the information disclosed, rather than
the time when this information is revealed.
Naturally, this latter kind of user profiling may
occur in conjunction with the former, but the degree of
sophistication and computational efforts are presum-
ably much higher for the former type of attacks, i.e.,
those that capitalize on content information. Mainly
for this reason, online social networking services and
microblogging services like Twitter and Facebook are
more prone to time-based profiling. In these infor-
mation systems, an attacker would have to analyze
the content of posts, where, in addition to text, users
often include images and videos. Processing all these
4. According to [35], the data-minimization principle means that
a data controller, e.g., the social-networking platform, should re-
strict the collection of personal data to what is strictly necessary to
achieve its purpose. Also, it implies that the controller should store
the data only for as long as is necessary to fulfil the purpose for
which the information was collected.
5. A tweet is a message sent using Twitter.
Fig. 1: Message deferral as a mechanism to protect the privacy of
the online activity of a user by delaying the submission of certain
messages.
data and extracting features from them would require
far more computational efforts6 than simply retrieving
the timestamp field of those posts. A Web application
that exemplifies the ease with which time-based pro-
files can be built is [36].
Despite the potential occurrence of these time-based
profiling attacks and the evident privacy risks they
entail, we acknowledge that, within the context of
certain social-networking applications, users may not
be willing to tolerate a degradation of the intended
functionality due to message deferral. This is the
case, for example, of real-time conversations, which
may not be particularly conducive to our privacy
mechanism. We believe, however, that many other
uses of the social networks may allow it.
3.4 Adversary Model
In order to evaluate the level of privacy provided
by our mechanism, it is fundamental to specify the
concrete assumptions about the attacker, that is, its
capabilities, properties or powers. This is known as
the adversary model and its importance lies in the fact
that the level of privacy provided is measured with
respect to it.
Next, we describe the adversary model assumed
in this work, in terms of the application scenario
considered, the type of adversaries able to profile
users, the way these adversaries model user activity,
and the objective behind the construction of these
activity models.
• Scenario. First, we consider a typical scenario
where users are required to be logged into a social
networking site for their messages to be posted.
This could be the case of Google Plus, Twitter
and Facebook. In addition, we may reasonably
assume that users of these applications provide
their real identifiers to create their accounts. We
must hasten to stress that, even though a user em-
ploys pseudonyms, the content of the messages
exchanged or the knowledge of their “friends”
in those social networks may lead an attacker to
ascertain the actual identity of this user.
6. This is in contrast to other information systems where user
data (e.g., tags, queries or ratings) are simpler to process.
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Fig. 2: Actual user profile (a) and apparent user profile (b). Both profiles represent the profile of activity across a day, in particular, the
percentage of messages posted between 0 a.m. and 1 a.m., 1 a.m. and 2 a.m., and so on.
• Privacy attackers. In this scenario, any entity
capable of capturing users’ messages is regarded
as a potential privacy attacker. This includes
the social network provider, the Internet ser-
vice provider (ISP), and the intermediary entities
(switches, routers, firewalls) enabling the commu-
nications between users and social networking
sites. Besides, since posted messages are often
publicly available7, any entity able to collect this
information is also taken into consideration in our
adversary model.
• User-profile model. We assume that the attacker
represents behavioral patterns of online user ac-
tivity as probability mass functions (PMFs). Con-
ceptually, a user profile may be interpreted as
a histogram of relative frequencies of messages
across a day, week, month or year. The pro-
posed user-profile model is a natural, intuitive
representation in line with the models used in
many information systems to characterize user
profiles [27], [37], [38], [39], [40].
In our adversary model, we distinguish between
two kinds of profiles. On the one hand, the user’s
genuine profile, and on the other, the profile
perceived from the outside, which results from
delaying certain messages before posting them.
Hereafter, we shall refer to these two profiles
as the actual profile q and the apparent profile
t. That said, in this work we shall assume that
the attacker is unaware or ignores the fact that
the observed, perturbed profile does not reflect
the actual behavior of the user. Fig. 2 provides
an example of such profiles. In this figure we
represent the profile of online activity of a user
within 1-hour slot throughout one day.
• Objective behind profiling. Finally, our adver-
sary model contemplates what the attacker is af-
ter when profiling users. According to [40], and in
line with the technical literature of profiling [41],
7. Messages exchanged on Twitter are publicly visible by default.
[42], we assume that the attacker’s ultimate goal
is to target peculiar users. Put differently, we
consider an adversary that aims to find users
who deviate significantly from the average and
common activity profile.
The goal of profiling, together with the assumptions
about the scenario and the user-profile representation,
constitute the adversary model upon which our pri-
vacy metric builds.
3.5 Privacy Metric of Online Activity
Next, we justify the Shannon entropy and the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence as measures of pri-
vacy when an attacker aims to target uncommon users
based on their profiles of activity. The rationale behind
the use of these two information-theoretic quantities
as privacy metrics is documented in greater detail
in [40].
Recall that Shannon’s entropy H(t) of a discrete
random variable (r.v.) with PMF t = (ti)ni=1 on the
alphabet {1, . . . , n} is a measure of the uncertainty of
the outcome of this r.v., defined as
H(t) = −
∑
ti log ti.
Throughout this work, all logarithms are taken to base
2, and subsequently the entropy units are bits. Given
two probability distributions t and p over the same
alphabet, the KL divergence is defined as
D(t ‖ p) =
∑
ti log
ti
pi
.
The KL divergence is often referred to as relative
entropy, as it may be regarded as a generalization
of the Shannon entropy of a distribution, relative to
another. Conversely, Shannon’s entropy is a special
case of KL divergence, as for a uniform distribution
u on a finite alphabet of cardinality n,
D(t ‖u) = log n−H(t). (1)
Leveraging on a celebrated information-theoretic
rationale by Jaynes [43], the Shannon entropy of an
8apparent user profile, modeled as a PMF, may be
regarded as a measure of privacy, or more accurately,
anonymity. The leading idea is that the method of
types [44] from information theory establishes an
approximate monotonic relationship between the like-
lihood of a PMF in a stochastic system and its entropy.
Loosely speaking, the higher the entropy of a profile,
the more likely it is that the more users behave
according to it. Under this interpretation, entropy is a
measure of anonymity, not in the sense that the user’s
identity remains unknown, but only in the sense that
higher likelihood of an apparent profile, believed by
an external observer to be the actual profile, makes
that profile more common, hopefully helping the user
go unnoticed, less interesting to an attacker whose
objective is to seek peculiar users.
If an aggregated histogram of the whole popu-
lation of users were available as a reference pro-
file p, the extension of Jaynes’ argument to relative
entropy would also give an acceptable measure of
anonymity. Recall that KL divergence is a measure of
discrepancy between probability distributions, which
includes Shannon’s entropy as the special case when
the reference distribution is uniform. Conceptually,
a lower KL divergence hides discrepancies with re-
spect to a reference profile, say the population’s, and
there also exists a monotonic relationship between the
likelihood of a distribution and its divergence with
respect to the reference distribution of choice, which
enables us to deem KL divergence as a measure of
anonymity in a sense entirely analogous to the above
mentioned.
Under this interpretation, the Shannon entropy is
therefore interpreted as an indicator of the common-
ness of similar profiles. As such, Shannon’s entropy
appears as a meaningful anonymity measure since it
effectively captures the attacker’s goal behind pro-
filing. We should hasten to stress that the Shannon
entropy is a measure of anonymity rather than privacy,
in the sense that the obfuscated information is the
uniqueness of the profile behind the online activity,
rather than the actual profile itself.
3.6 Formulation of the Trade-Off between Privacy
and Message-Deferral Rate
In this section, we present a formulation of the op-
timal privacy-utility trade-off posed by our message-
deferral mechanism.
In our mathematical model, we represent the mes-
sages of a user as a sequence of independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) r.v.’s taking on values in
a common finite alphabet of n time periods, namely
the set {1, . . . , n} for some integer n > 2. As an
example, the set of time periods could be the hours of
a day or a week, or the days of a month. According to
this model, we characterize the actual profile of a user
as the common PMF of these r.v.’s, q = (q1, . . . , qn).
In conceptual terms, our model of user profile is a
normalized histogram of messages over those time
periods.
Based on this model, we quantify the initial privacy
level as the Shannon entropy of the user’s actual
profile, H(q). For the sake of tractability, we measure
utility as the deferral rate ϕ ∈ [0, 1), that is, the ratio
of the number of messages that a user is willing to
delay to the total number of messages.
When a user accepts delaying their tweets, com-
ments or, in general, messages, their actual profile
q is seen from the outside as the apparent profile
t = q − s + r, according to a storing strategy s and a
forwarding strategy r. These strategies are two n-tuples
that would tell the user when to retain those messages
and when to release them. More specifically, the i-th
component of the storing strategy is the fraction of
messages that this user should store at time period
i. Similarly, ri is the proportion of messages to total
number of messages that the user should forward
at time i. Clearly, these two strategies must satisfy
that si, ri > 0, qi − si + ri > 0, for all i, and that∑
si =
∑
ri = ϕ so that t is a PMF.
According to this notation, we denote by H(t) the
(final) privacy level and define the privacy-deferral
function as
P(ϕ) = max
r,s
ri>0, si>0,
qi−si+ri>0,∑
si=
∑
ri=ϕ
H(q − s+ r), (2)
which models the optimal trade-off between privacy
and message-deferral rate.
The optimization problem inherent in this definition
belongs to the extensively studied class of convex
optimization problems [45]. Most of these problems
do not have an analytical solution and thus need to
be solved numerically. For this, there exist a number
of extremely efficient methods, such as interior-point
algorithms. The problem formulated here, however,
turns out to be a particular case of a more general
optimization problem, for which interestingly there is
an explicit closed-form solution, albeit piecewise [46].
In practice, this means that we shall be able to
find an analytical expression for the optimal storing
and forwarding strategies, i.e., those strategies that
maximize user privacy for a given ϕ. Later on, in
Sec. 5.1, we shall show that (2) is a particularization
of this latter problem.
4 ARCHITECTURE
As we commented on Sec. 3.2, our PET leverages on
the hard-privacy model. In essence, this means that
users seek to safeguard their privacy themselves, since
any communicating entity (e.g., the network provider,
social-networking platform, ISP) may be regarded as
a potential attacker. Because our mechanism takes
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Fig. 3: Example of user profile (a) and its optimal storing and forwarding strategies r and s (b) for a deferral-message rate ϕ = 4%.
place on their side and therefore does not rely on any
external party, it offers hard-privacy protection.
In this section, we specify the building blocks of
an architecture implementing our privacy-enhancing,
message-deferral mechanism. As we shall see later,
the system architecture revolves around a module
that computes the optimal forwarding and storing
strategies from (2). In essence, the proposed system
will employ these two strategies to distort the actual
profile in a way that user privacy is maximized. We
would like to stress that, since our data-perturbative
mechanism is optimized for any message-deferral
rate, any perturbation introduced in the actual profile
will always be in the direction of providing a better
privacy protection. In other words, and in contrast
to randomized perturbative mechanisms, deviations
from the actual profile caused by our mechanism
always guarantee an improvement in privacy.
The architecture proposed in this section provides
high-level functional aspects so that our PET can
be implemented as software running on the user’s
local machine, for example, in the form of a Web-
browser extension. Specifically, our architecture builds
on the aforementioned hard-privacy model, which
implies that users need not trust any external entity
to protect their privacy. We only assume, however,
that users trust the piece of software that implements
our mechanism, in terms of the data it collects and its
execution, exactly as they trust their Web browser.
Our assumptions about the proposed architecture
are described next:
• First, we assume that both the user and the ad-
versary use the same time periods, for example,
24 uniformly distributed time slots within a day.
This implies that the profile computed on the
user’s side coincides with the profile built by the
attacker.
• Secondly, according to equation (2), our approach
needs the user’s actual profile q to compute the
optimal storing and forwarding strategies. Be-
cause of this, we contemplate a training period
before our architecture starts delaying messages.
However, since the attacker might learn about the
user profile during this training period, the user
could alternatively provide the software with an
estimate of their profile.
• Lastly, we suppose that, in the estimation of the
relative histogram, the components of the user
profile remain stable after the training phase. We
acknowledge, however, that a practical imple-
mentation of our mechanism should take into ac-
count that the user activity may vary significantly
over time.
Before we proceed with the description of our archi-
tecture, we shall provide an example showing what
the optimal storing and forwarding strategies mean
in practice. For this, consider the profile q depicted
in Fig. 3(a), which corresponds to a user with initial
privacy risk P(0) ' 4.2775 bits. If this user decided to
delay ϕ = 4% of their messages, the relative privacy
gain would be around 5.18%. That is, in this particular
case we observe that the privacy gain would be,
interestingly, greater than the delay rate introduced.
The optimal strategies are illustrated in Fig. 3(b).
The storing strategy suggests buffering 3.37% and
0.63% of messages at time instants 1 and 2, respec-
tively8. On the other hand, the forwarding strategy
recommends extracting 0.84% of the total number of
messages from the buffer at time periods 7, 8, 9 and
10, and 0.64% of the messages at time 13.
In Fig. 4 we depict the proposed architecture, which
consists of a number of modules, each of them per-
forming a specific task. From a general perspective,
this figure shows a user interacting with a social
networking site, an entity that basically stores the
messages generated by this and other users. Next, we
provide a functional description of the modules of this
architecture.
• User-profile constructor. It is responsible for the
estimation of the user’s profile. Specifically, this
module receives the messages the user generates,
8. Those time instants are, in fact, time periods of one hour each.
In particular, the time index i consists in the interval (i− 1, i].
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Fig. 4: Architecture implementing the message-deferral mechanism.
and computes a histogram of relative frequencies
of these messages within, for example, 1-hour slot
throughout one day. Afterwards, this profile is
submitted to the storing and forwarding strategies
generator.
We would like to emphasize that this module
is active even when the user explicitly declares
their profile. Since the profile specified by the
user may not be an accurate reflection of their on-
line behavior, our architecture may decide, after
the training phase, to replace it with the profile
implicitly inferred from the posted messages.
• Storing and forwarding strategies generator.
This module is the core of the architecture as
it is responsible for computing the solution to
the optimization problem inherent in function (2).
To this end, this component is first provided
with the user profile and the message-deferral
rate. Secondly, the module uses this information
to compute the optimal tuples of storing and
forwarding; and finally, those tuples are given to
the storage selector module and to the forwarding
selector block.
• Storage selector. The functionality of this module
is to warn the user when they should delay
messages9. Specifically, at time period i, with
probability si/qi the user should send a message
to the buffer implemented in the forwarding selec-
tor module. On the other hand, with probability
1 − si/qi, this message should be submitted di-
rectly to the social networking site.
• Forwarding selector. This block includes a buffer
where messages are stored. Its main functionality
is to output messages from this buffer according
to the optimal forwarding strategy r. In par-
ticular, this module would operate as follows:
throughout time slot i, the module would send
α ri messages from the buffer to the service
provider, where α represents the total number
9. This would be, in fact, transparent to the user. The software
installed on the user’s machine would decide whether a message
is to be delayed or not.
of messages generated within the time period
covered by the profile, e.g., one day.
This block also considers the possibility of as-
signing priorities to messages. For instance, it
could be necessary that certain messages stored
in the buffer have different levels of priority. As
an example, those messages generated during
working hours could have a higher likelihood of
leaving the buffer. Other alternatives include first
in, first out (FIFO), last in, first out (LIFO) and
uniformly-random extraction. This last option is
precisely the one considered in Sec. 5.
5 EXPECTED DELAY AND MESSAGE-
STORAGE CAPACITY
In Sec. 3.6 we characterized the optimal privacy-
utility trade-off posed by message deferral, in terms
of the Shannon entropy of the apparent profile as
measure of privacy, and the message-deferral rate as
measure of utility. In that same subsection, we also
mentioned that the optimization problem character-
izing this trade-off is a particular case of a more
general optimization problem for which there exists
a closed-form solution. Although this allows us to
obtain analytically our optimal storing and forward-
ing strategies for a given deferral rate, users would
certainly benefit from more meaningful metrics of loss
in usability than this fraction of messages delayed. In
other words, it would be interesting and even nec-
essary to investigate more elaborate and informative
utility measures, capturing the actual impact that our
mechanism would have.
Motivated by this, in this section we examine more
sophisticated metrics such as the expected delay ex-
perienced by messages and the capacity of the buffer
where these messages are stored. Further, we inves-
tigate how they relate each other, under the premise
that messages are output from the buffer uniformly
at random, that is, without considering any kind of
priority such as FIFO or LIFO.
This section is structured as follows. First, Sec. 5.1
examines some interesting results derived from the
more general optimization problem examined in [46].
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Then, Sec. 5.2 presents a mathematical analysis model-
ing the utility metrics mentioned above, namely, the
expected delay and buffer capacity. Finally, Sec. 5.3
provides an example illustrating the theoretical results
obtained in the previous subsection.
5.1 Preliminaries
The optimization problem investigated in [46] is a
resource allocation problem that arises in the context
of privacy protection in recommendation systems. In
the cited work, the authors model the privacy-utility
trade-off posed by a data-perturbative mechanism
consisting in the forgery and the elimination of rat-
ings. Specifically, the privacy risk R is measured as
the KL divergence between the apparent profile of
interests10 and the population’s distribution of items
p. On the other hand, the loss in accuracy of recom-
mendations is measured as the percentages of ratings
ρ and σ that the user would be willing to forge and
suppress, respectively. Accordingly, the optimal trade-
off between privacy and utility is defined as
R(ρ, σ) = min
r,s
ri>0, si>0,
qi−si+ri>0,∑
si=σ,
∑
ri=ρ
D
(
q − s+ r
1− σ + ρ
∥∥∥∥ p) , (3)
where the optimization variables are a forgery strategy
r and a suppression strategy s.
In light of this formulation, it is straightforward to
check, by virtue of (1), that
P(ϕ) = log n−R(ϕ,ϕ)|p=u.
In words, the function (2) characterizing the trade-
off between privacy and message-deferral rate is a
special case of the optimization problem (3), when the
rates of forgery and suppression are equal to ϕ and
the population’s distribution is the uniform distribu-
tion. In the context of our formulation, the forgery
and suppression strategies clearly correspond to the
forwarding and storing strategies, respectively.
Having shown then that (2) is a particular case
of (3), next we review a couple of results presented
in [46] to be used in the coming sections.
The most relevant result is the intuitive principle
that the optimal storing and forwarding strategies
follow. Specifically, the former strategy lowers the
highest values of qi until these values are equal. This
is done in such a way that the values lowered amount
to ϕ. In a completely analogous manner, the latter
strategy raises the lowest values of qi until they match,
for a total probability mass increment of ϕ. Finally,
intermediate values of qi remain unperturbed. Simply
put, the effect of the optimal strategies on the actual
user profile may be regarded as a combination of
10. Here users’ profiles do not capture their interests, but their
online activity.
Fig. 5: This figure illustrates the intuition behind the optimal storing
and forwarding strategies. Here, we have represented the actual
user profile q depicted in Fig. 3(a). The optimal apparent profile
t is obtained by applying the strategies shown in Fig. 3(b), which
correspond to a deferral rate ϕ = 0.04.
the well-known water-filling and reverse water-filling
problems [45, §5.5].
The aforementioned principle was already antici-
pated in Fig. 3. In Fig. 5 we illustrate this more clearly.
Particularly, this figure depicts the actual user profile
shown in Fig.3(a) and its optimal apparent profile,
resulting from the application of the optimal storing
and forwarding strategies represented in Fig. 3(b). In
Fig. 5, however, the components of those two profiles
are sorted in increasing order of activity to emphasize
the way these strategies operate.
Another interesting result from [46] confirms the
intuition that there must exist a pair (ρ, σ) such that
the privacy risk vanishes. In the context of our for-
mulation, this implies that there is a deferral rate ϕ
beyond which the maximum level of privacy or critical
privacy is attained11. We refer to this rate as the critical
message-deferral rate ϕcrit.
Recall [44] that the variational distance between two
PMFs p and q is defined as
TV(p ‖ q) = 12
∑
i
|pi − qi| .
It can be shown [46] that the critical rate yields
ϕcrit = TV(u ‖ q). (4)
From this expression, it is easy to verify that ϕcrit > 0,
with equality if, and only if, q = u. Later on, in Sec. 6,
we shall determine the average critical rate within a
population of Twitter, Facebook and Instagram users,
as well as the PMF of this crucial parameter.
The last result is related to the orthogonality of
the components of s and r. Specifically, it follows
from [46] that, for any ϕ 6 ϕcrit, the optimal storing
and forwarding strategies satisfy
sk rk = 0,
11. Recall from Sec. 3.5 that Shannon’s entropy is regarded
here as a measure of privacy gain, whereas the KL divergence is
interpreted as a measure of privacy risk.
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Fig. 6: Example of optimal storing and forwarding strategies which
do not satisfy the principle of causality.
for k = 1, . . . , n. The orthogonality of both strategies,
in the sense indicated above, conforms to intuition—
it would not make any sense to store messages in
a given time period and, at the same time period,
forward messages to the social networking server.
This result is implicitly assumed throughout next
subsection, Sec. 5.2.
5.2 Theoretical Analysis
Denote by s = (s1, . . . , sn) and r = (r1, . . . , rn) the
solutions to the problem (2), conceptually, a storing
strategy and a forwarding strategy that maximize the
Shannon entropy of the apparent profile, H(t). Recall
that these two tuples must satisfy∑
si =
∑
ri = ϕ. (5)
In Fig. 3(b) we depicted an example of these tuples.
In that figure, the time instants when messages were
stored were preceding the time instants when these
messages were forwarded. That is, the figure showed
the logical sequence in which messages are first kept
in the buffer and then they are flushed out.
However, the solutions s and r do not need to
satisfy this principle of causality; this was not spec-
ified as a constraint in the optimization problem (2).
In fact, regardless of whether causality is satisfied or
not, these two tuples must be interpreted as cyclic se-
quences, which are repeated continuously, e.g., every
day or week, depending on the time frame covered
by the user profile. This is how the storing and the
forwarding strategies must be construed then in Fig. 6.
Here, although no messages are forwarded at the
time instants 1, 2 and 3 of the first cycle (day), in
subsequent cycles these time instants will be used to
output messages.
In the remainder of this section, we shall mathe-
matically model the buffer. Specifically, we shall find
a time instant such that, if the tuples s, r are moved
to start at this instant, then every message to be
forwarded during the next n consecutive time periods
will actually be forwarded. This is time period 7 in
the example shown in Fig. 6. With this time index,
we shall be able to proceed to find an expression for
the expected delay.
Denote by ai the n consecutive permutations of the
tuple si − ri,
a1 = ( s1 − r1 ,s2 − r2 , . . . , sn − rn ),
a2 = ( s2 − r2 , . . . ,sn − rn , s1 − r1 ),
...
an = (sn − rn ,s1 − r1 , . . . ,sn−1 − rn−1 ).
The j-th element of the tuple ai is denoted by ai,j .
Associated with each tuple ai, define the se-
quence (bi,j)
∞
j=1 as
bi,j =
{
max{ai,j , 0}, j = 1
max{bi,j−1 + ai,k, 0}, j = 2, 3, . . . ,
where k = j − nb j−1n c indexes cyclically the tuple ai.
Conceptually, each sequence bi models the ratio of
messages to total number of messages that are stored
in the buffer over the time index j, when the optimal
storing and forwarding strategies are applied cycli-
cally starting from the time index i.
Recall that the Heaviside step function [47] of a
discrete variable x is defined as
θ(x) =
{
0, x < 0
1, x > 0 .
Our first result demonstrates that, after a transient
state and regardless of the starting index i, these
sequences converge to a common, repeated pattern.
As we show next, this is a consequence of (5).
Lemma 1:
(i) There exists some index i = 1, . . . , n such that
bi,n = 0.
(ii) Let i be an index satisfying bi+1,n = 0. Then,
for any j = 1, . . . , n, there exists an index l =
i+ 1− j + n θ(j − i− 1) such that
bj,k+l = bi+1,k, for k = 1, 2, . . .
Proof: Define the n cumulative sums wi,j =∑j
k=1 ai+1,k for i = 1, . . . , n − 1, and wi,j =∑j
k=1 ai−n+1,k for i = n, where the index j ranges
from 1 to n. Note that wi,j = wn,i+j − wn,i, for
i + j 6 n; when i + j > n, substitute i + j for
i+ j −n. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be an index such that wn,i
is minimal. Then, it immediately follows that wi,j > 0
for j = 1, . . . , n, which implies, by virtue of (5), that
bi+1,n = 0. Note that this holds also for the index
i = n, for which b1,n = 0. This proves statement (i).
We have showed that the index i that minimizes
wn,k for all k satisfies bi+1,n = 0. To prove (ii), first we
shall show that bj,l = 0 for all j. To this end, replace
the index j with j + 1 in statement (ii), so that now
l = i − j + n θ(j − i) and j goes from 0 to n − 1.
Recall also that wi,j = wn,i+j −wn,i for i+ j 6 n, and
wi,j = wn,i+j−n−wn,i for i+ j > n. With the previous
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change of variable, note that wj,l = wn,i −wn,j . Here,
for consistency with the indexes of wi,j , we substitute
j = 0 for j = n. Having said this, observe that, for a
given j
min
k
wj,k = wn,i − wn,j = wj,l,
which clearly is nonpositive. Then, fix j and note that
the set of possible values that bj+1,k may take on are
wj,k plus the k terms wj,k − wj,m for m = 1, . . . , k.
Since mink wj,k = wj,l 6 0, it follows that bj+1,l = 0.
To conclude the proof, simply observe that aj+1,l+1 =
ai+1,1. 
Hereafter we shall refer to the starting index i as the
index satisfying bi,n = 0. Since Lemma 1 shows that all
sequences converge to a steady state where a pattern
is repeated continuously, our analysis is restricted to
the finite sequence (bi,j)
n
j=1 modeling this pattern and
its corresponding tuple ai.
Let C be the capacity of the buffer and α the total
number of messages generated by the user through-
out the considered time frame (a day, week, month,
etc.). The next result gives a straightforward expres-
sion for C when the steady state is achieved.
Corollary 2: Let i be the starting index. In the steady
state, the buffer capacity is
C = α max
j∈{1,...,n}
bi,j .
Proof: It is immediate from the definition of bi,j
and Lemma 1. 
Next, we shall reorder the tuples s, r so that they
begin at the starting index. Denote by s′,r′ the tuples
starting with this index i, formally
s′ = (s′1, s
′
2, . . . , s
′
n),
r′ = (r′1, r
′
2, . . . , r
′
n),
where s′k = sl and r
′
k = rl with l = i+k−1−nb i+k−2n c.
Note that, when we reorder the storing and forward-
ing tuples this way, for every r′j > 0 we can forward
exactly r′j messages at time period j.
In the following we define some notation that will
be used in Theorem 3. Let ∆ be an r.v. representing
the number of time periods a message is delayed.
Note that, on account of Lemma 1, the buffer does not
retain any message for more than n time units. Conse-
quently, the alphabet of ∆ is the set {1, . . . , n}. Denote
by δ¯ its expected value, E ∆. Let D be a Bernoulli r.v. of
parameter ϕ, modeling whether a message is delayed
or not. Namely, P{D = 1} = ϕ is the probability that
a message is delayed and P{D = 0} = 1 − ϕ is the
probability it is not. Finally, define the set
ω(j, k) = {l : r′l > 0, k < l < j}.
Our next result, Theorem 3, provides a closed-
form expression to calculate the expected delay in the
steady state.
Theorem 3: Let i be an index satisfying bi,n = 0.
Then,
δ¯ =
n∑
δ=1
δ
∑
j−k=δ,
r′j ,s
′
j>0
r′j s
′
k
bi,j−1
∏
l∈ω(j,k)
(
1− r
′
l
bi,l−1
)
.
Proof: From Lemma 1, we know that all sequences
bk for k = 1, . . . , n converge to the finite sequence
(bi,j)
n
j=1. Note that E ∆ = E E[∆|D] = ϕE∆|D[∆|D =
1]. Next, we proceed to calculate the conditional PMF
p∆|D(δ|1). Let A be an r.v. representing the time instant
when a message arrives at the buffer, and L, the
time instant when this message leaves the buffer.
Accordingly,
P{∆ = δ|D = 1}
=
∑
j−k=δ
P{L = j|A = k}P{A = k|D = 1}.
Observe that P{A = k|D = 1} = s′k/ϕ. Further, note
that P{L = j|A = k} is the probability that a message
is not forwarded at the time instants ω(j, k), that
is,
∏
l∈ω(j,k)
(
1− r′lbi,l−1
)
, multiplied by the probability
that this message is forwarded at time j, that is, r
′
j
bi,j−1
.
From this, it is immediate to derive the expression
given in the statement of the theorem. 
The expression obtained in Theorem 3 allows us
therefore to estimate the expected delay that messages
will experience for a given deferral rate. Although at
first sight it may seem there is not a direct dependence
on the parameter ϕ, recall that s and r are related to
this parameter through (5).
In conclusion, the results provided in this sub-
section enable us to establish a connection between
the message-deferral rate, i.e., our simplified, but
mathematically tractable measure of utility, and more
elaborate and informative utility metrics such as the
expected delay and the message-storage capacity.
5.3 Numerical Example
This subsection presents a numerical example that
illustrates the analysis conducted in the previous sub-
section, and shows the privacy level achieved by a
user who adheres to the proposed message-deferral
mechanism. Throughout this subsection, all results
correspond to the same user.
In Fig. 7 we represent the apparent profile of
this user for different values of the message-deferral
rate ϕ. When ϕ = 0, no perturbation takes place and
the apparent profile t represented in Fig. 7(a) actually
corresponds to the genuine user profile q. According
to the reasoning behind the optimal storing and for-
warding strategies described in Sec. 5.1, the higher ϕ,
the more uniform is the resulting apparent profile.
The maximum level of privacy is attained precisely
for ϕ = ϕcrit ' 0.3206, when the apparent profile is
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(a) ϕ = 0, H(t) ' 4.1060 bits.
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(b) ϕ ' 0.1111, H(t) ' 4.4402 bits.
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(c) ϕ ' 0.2222, H(t) ' 4.5567 bits.
Time of day [hour]
(d) ϕ ' 0.3206, H(t) ' 4.5850 bits.
Fig. 7: Apparent profiles for different values of ϕ.
completely uniform and therefore H(t) = log 24 '
4.5850 bits. All this information is also captured in
Fig. 8, where we plot the privacy-deferral function (2),
that is, the function modeling the optimal trade-off
between privacy and utility, the latter being measured
as the percentage of messages delayed.
In Fig. 9(a) we depicted the expected delay δ¯ for
different values of ϕ. In particular, the results shown
in this figure were computed theoretically, by ap-
plying Theorem 3, and experimentally. These latter
experimental results were obtained by simulating the
storing and forwarding processes as specified by the
blocks storage selector and forwarding selector of the
proposed architecture (see Sec. 4). Fig. 9(a) tells us, for
example, that for ϕ = 0.10, the messages delayed were
kept on the buffer for around 1.5 hours on average. As
expected, for ϕ 6 ϕcrit, we observe that δ¯ exhibits an
increasing, nonlinear behavior with ϕ. The case when
ϕ > ϕcrit is of no interest as, in practice, a user would
not delay more messages than those strictly necessary
to achieve the maximum level of privacy.
Finally, Fig. 9(b) shows, for different values of ϕ, the
ratio between the number of messages stored in the
buffer and the total number of messages generated
by the user. For instance, when the user specifies ϕ =
0.10, the buffer must be designed to keep around 10%
of all messages sent over a day. Clearly, we note that
the buffer capacity is nonlinear with the deferral rate.
Also, we observe that the user would need to store
28.1% of their messages for the apparent profile to
become the uniform distribution.
6 EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
In this section we evaluate the extent to which the
deferral of messages could enhance user privacy in
a real-world scenario. The social networks chosen to
conduct this evaluation are Twitter, Facebook and In-
stagram. With this experimental evaluation, we aim at
demonstrating the technical feasibility of our scheme,
and the benefits it would bring to both users and
social networking sites.
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in relative terms, compared to the user’s activity.
TABLE 1: Summary of the data sets used in our experimental
evaluation.
Number of users Average activity (messages)
Twitter 144 1 879.42
Facebook 529 208.40
Instagram 610 397.27
6.1 Data Sets
Our analysis has been conducted on the basis of
three different data sets. In the case of Twitter, we
employed 144 users, whose profiles were retrieved by
using the Twitter API12. In particular, we gathered the
timestamps of all public messages generated by those
users before Oct. 25, 2013. From this information, we
built their profiles as normalized histograms of tweets
across 24 uniformly distributed time slots within one
day. Previously, we filtered out those users with an
activity level lower than 50 posts, since it would have
been difficult to calculate a reliable estimate of their
profiles with such a few messages. On average, users
posted 1 879.42 messages each.
In the case of Facebook and Instagram, on the other
hand, we relied on publicly available data sets. In the
former social network, we experimented with the data
set retrieved by the Software Systems group at the
Max Planck Institute [48]. The data set in question
contains wall posts from the Facebook New Orleans
networks. As with the Twitter data, we eliminated
those users with a low activity profile. The number
of users and posts reduced to 529 and 110 243 re-
spectively, yielding an average of 208.40 messages per
user. Finally, as for Instagram, we used the data set
available at [49] which included the comments posted
to media by more than 2 100 users. After applying the
preprocessing described above, the number of users
became 610, posting 397.27 messages on average.
Table 1 provides a summary of the data sets utilized
in this experimental section.
12. https://dev.twitter.com
6.2 Privacy Technologies
In these experiments, we shall compare the proposed
message-deferral strategy with two privacy mecha-
nisms that pertain to the category of data pertur-
bation. These mechanisms are message forgery and
uniform deferral.
Information forgery is a rather common strategy
for privacy protection, which has been studied in
the context of several applications, from informa-
tion retrieval [24], to anonymous-communication sys-
tems [15], to Web browsing [25], and to recommen-
dation systems [46]. In this experimental evaluation,
we shall consider the submission of false messages
to counter time-based profiling attacks in social net-
works, although, as commented in Sec. 2.2, this strat-
egy might not be adopted in real practice: users of
these online services might not be disposed to post
fake comments, since this might have a significant
negative effect on the functionality provided by such
services.
We shall use the notation introduced in Sec. 5.1
for rating forgery in recommendation systems, and
accordingly denote by ρ ∈ [0,∞) the ratio of false
messages to total posted messages. For the sake of a
fair comparison, we shall consider an optimized ver-
sion of this message-forgery mechanism, in the sense
of maximizing the same privacy objective (Shannon’s
entropy) for a given ρ. It can be straightforwardly
shown that the problem of optimal message forgery
is equivalent to the problem (3) for σ = 0. Finally,
as with message deferral, ρcrit will denote the forgery
rate beyond which the maximum level of privacy is
achieved.
On the other hand, our comparative analysis will
include a naive deferral mechanism that will serve as
a baseline assessment. In particular, this mechanism
will rely on the same message-deferral rate ϕ, but
the delay experienced by each message will be drawn
from a uniform distribution on the set {1, . . . , 24}. It
can be shown that this naive technique is equivalent
to assuming r = ϕu and s = ϕ q, or considering the
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Fig. 10: Probability distribution of the critical rates of optimized deferral and forgery for the three data sets considered in Sec. 6.
convex combination t = (1 − ϕ) q + ϕu. By virtue of
these equivalences, it is also straightforward to verify
that uniform deferral attains critical privacy if, and
only if, ϕ = 1. This is obviously in the non-trivial
case when q 6= u. Throughout this section, we shall
occasionally refer this strategy as “random” deferral.
6.3 Results
In our first series of experiments, we computed the
probability distribution of ϕcrit and ρcrit, that is, the
deferral and forgery rates beyond which the maxi-
mum privacy level is attained13. The PMFs of such
critical rates are shown in Fig. 10. In the case of
optimized message deferral and the Twitter data set,
we observe that the minimum, maximum and average
values of ϕcrit are approximately 0.01, 0.67 and 0.33.
Also, we spot that a significant mass of probability
is concentrated between ϕ ' 0.2 and ϕ ' 0.4, in
particular, a 74% of users. This means that most
users will not require delaying a large percentage of
their tweets for their apparent profiles to become the
uniform distribution.
Similar results are observed for the other two data
sets. In the case of Facebook, for example, the critical
deferral rate has an average value of 0.33, slightly
smaller than for Twitter, but the minimum value is
0.14. As for Instagram, the results are a bit better:
the maximum and average values of ϕcrit are 0.53 and
0.30, respectively.
13. We omit the distribution of the critical-deferral rate for the
uniform strategy since, as commented in Sec. 6.2, this strategy
achieves critical privacy only when ϕ = 1. Consequently, the PMF
of the critical rate is the trivial Dirac delta function centered at 1.
The distributions of the critical forgery rate are
plotted in Figs. 10(d-f). The main conclusion that can
be drawn from these figures is that users will need
large values of ρ, in most cases above 100%, for their
privacy to attain the maximum level. The results for
Twitter, Facebook and Instagram yield an average
rate of 1.921, 1.932 and 1.794, respectively. This is in
contrast to the critical rate of the proposed deferral
mechanism, which by definition cannot exceed 1.
The following figure, Fig. 11, shows the PMFs of the
expected delay for our optimized deferral mechanism
and for the uniform deferral strategy set forth in
Sec. 6.2. The results are plotted in the case when
all users apply these two mechanisms with the crit-
ical deferral rate of our optimized technology, given
by (4). The results provided for optimized deferral has
been obtained analytically by using the expressions
derived in Sec. 5.2.
From Figs. 11(a-c), we check that the values of
δ¯|ϕ=ϕcrit are roughly concentrated between 1 and 8
hours. In the case of Twitter, however, the probability
distribution seems to be more dispersed. The average
values for this social network, Facebook and Insta-
gram are 3.898, 3.474 and 2.996, respectively, which
means that Instagram users will experience smaller
average delays for the same level of (maximum) pri-
vacy protection.
In the case of “random” deferral (Figs. 11(d-f)), not
entirely unexpectedly we spot more scattered distri-
butions of δ¯|ϕ=ϕcrit . For example, in the three data sets
considered in these experiments, we notice expected
delays of up to 14 hours, whereas the maximum value
provided by our optimized deferral strategy was 9.05
hours. In addition, we observe that the mean values
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Fig. 11: PMFs of the expected delay when all users apply a deferral rate ϕ = ϕcrit, for the optimized deferral strategy proposed in this
work and for the naive “random” delay mechanism described in Sec. 6.2.
for the Twitter, Facebook and Instagram data sets
are significantly greater than those exhibited by our
mechanism. In particular, these mean values show
an increase of 67.8% (Twitter), 24.5% (Facebook) and
66.3% (Instagram) with respect to optimized deferral.
Fig. 12 shows the buffer capacity for the optimized
deferral mechanism and for the uniform strategy de-
scribed in Sec. 6.2. Analogously to Fig. 11, these results
have been obtained under the assumption that users
choose a deferral rate ϕ = ϕcrit as given by (4).
From Fig. 12(a), we notice that the minimum, mean
and maximum values of C|ϕ=ϕcrit are 8.92, 31.24 and
63.52% of Twitter users’ messages. Similar results
are observed for the other two data sets. In the
case of Facebook and Instagram, though, we notice
slightly smaller mean values of capacity. In particular,
Figs. 12(b-c) show an expected buffer size of 28.31%
and 27.75% of users’ messages, respectively.
In the case of a uniform delay strategy, we observe
users with buffer capacities around 1% for Twitter,
and approximately 3% and 2% for Facebook and
Instagram. This is in stark contrast to the deferral
mechanism investigated in this work, which, accord-
ing to these experiments, requires a minimum of
10% of message-storage capacity to attain the critical
privacy. We note, however, that these smaller values of
capacity (observed for uniform deferral) do not imply
that users will achieve the maximum level of privacy.
In fact, as we commented in Sec. 6.2, the naive deferral
strategy achieves critical privacy if, and only if, ϕ = 1.
Finally, we notice that the mean values of capacity
for the Twitter, Facebook and Instagram data sets are
17.7%, 18.6% and 11.6% of user messages.
The second set of experiments contemplates a
scenario where all users apply the three privacy-
enhancing mechanisms under study, by using a com-
mon message deferral and forgery rate. Note that, in
practice, each user would configure this rate indepen-
dently, according to their specific privacy and utility
requirements. Under the assumption of a common
rate, Fig. 13 shows the privacy protection achieved
by those users in terms of percentile curves (10th,
50th and 90th) of relative privacy gain. In the case
of optimized deferral and forgery, these results have
been obtained by applying the closed-form expression
for the optimal storing and forwarding strategies de-
rived in [46]. Specifically, we computed the optimal
strategies of each user for 100 uniformly distributed
values of ϕ, ρ ∈ [0, 0.999].
We start our analysis of this figure with optimized
deferral and the Twitter data set. In Fig. 13(a), we
observe how the percentile curves of relative privacy
gain increase with ϕ until a certain rate, beyond which
these curves are constant. This is consistent with the
fact that users attain the maximum level of privacy,
log n, for ϕ > ϕcrit. An interesting conclusion that can
be drawn from this figure is that Twitter will require
relatively small margins of privacy gain to achieve
the critical-privacy level. This may be observed, for
example, for ϕ = 0.60, i.e., when almost all users
get their maximum level of privacy, according to
Fig. 10(a). Concretely, for this value of ϕ, the 10th, 50th
and 90th percentile curves show privacy gains of only
4.59%, 10.78% and 27.60%, respectively.
When the strategy is to post false messages, rather
than delaying them, we observe percentile curves
with a lower rate of increase than for optimized
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Fig. 12: Buffer capacity for different values of the message-deferral rate, and for the optimized and uniform deferral strategies. The buffer
requirements are expressed in relative terms, compared to users’ activity.
deferral. For example, while the 90th percentile curve
attains its maximum value, 28.41%, for ϕ ' 0.49, mes-
sage forgery does not provide this level of protection
even for ρ = 0.999 (see Fig. 13(b). A similar behavior
is observed for the 10th and 50th percentile curves.
In the special case of uniform deferral, we notice
that for values of ϕ smaller than 0.69 approximately,
the 90th percentile curve is lower than that of message
forgery. However, for ϕ > 0.69, the trend is reversed
and users safeguard their privacy more efficiently by
applying uniformly distributed delays. This, though,
should come as no surprise, as according to Figs. 10(d-
f) message forgery exhibits an average ρcrit > 1.794 in
the three data sets. In other words, users applying uni-
form deferral attain higher values of privacy gain for
large perturbation rates, when compared to forgery.
Similar conclusions can be derived from the Face-
book and Instagram data sets, with the main re-
sult being that optimized deferral again outperforms
forgery and uniform delay. From Fig. 13(b,e,h), we
observe that for ϕ = 0.39, 90% of Facebook users
obtain a relative privacy gain greater than 21.6%. For
an identical value of forgery rate, the submission of
false messages by that same fraction of users would
increase their privacy by at least 16.8%, almost 5 per-
centage points below optimized deferral. In the case
of uniform deferral, this difference is accentuated for
that deferral rate; we see 2.5 percentage points below
forgery. However, for ϕ > 0.71, the 90th percentile
curve surpasses that of message forgery.
On the other hand, the differences in relative pri-
vacy gain between the three data sets can be ex-
plained on the basis of the initial privacy values. The
fact that we have smaller values of privacy gain for
Instagram users is solely because these users have
more flattened profiles than those of Facebook and
Twitter. In particular, the average initial privacy (i.e.,
when ϕ = ρ = 0) is 4.0230, 4.0410 and 4.1067 bits
for the users of Twitter, Facebook and Instagram,
respectively.
The upshot of this analysis of the three technologies
in terms of critical rate, delay, capacity and privacy
gain, is that our PET strategy offers better privacy
guarantees for any of the utility metrics considered
in these experiments. For a given ϕ, the uniform
strategy may lead to smaller expected delays and
buffer capacities, but obviously the level of privacy at-
tained is not comparable to that of optimized deferral
and forgery. This result is true only for forgery rates
roughly on the interval [0,0.7]. For larger values of ϕ,
uniform deferral is more effective in protecting user
privacy than forgery. As mentioned above, this is due
to the fact that the forgery mechanism requires large
rates of false messages, compared to uniform deferral
(ϕcrit = 1) and optimized deferral (ϕcrit ∈ [0.01, 0.67]
from Figs. 10(a-c)).
Having examined the impact of our privacy mech-
anism on message delay, capacity and user privacy,
now we look at the effect it might have from the
point of view of traffic load. Recall that the objective of
message deferral is to maximize the Shannon entropy
of the apparent profile and thus to spread user activity
uniformly over time. This is obviously beneficial from
the standpoint of user privacy, as we have observed
in our previous series of experiments. But at the same
time, entropy maximization may help social network-
ing sites manage their networking resources more
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Fig. 13: Percentile curves of relative privacy gain for different values of ϕ, for the three privacy technologies examined in these experiments,
and for our Twitter, Facebook and Instagram data sets.
efficiently, as our mechanism contributes to distribute
the message traffic load evenly.
Fig. 14 illustrates this point. In particular, it shows
the percentage of messages posted to Twitter by our
set of users within a day. Since we computed this as
the aggregated profile of all users, we refer to it as
the population’s profile p. The modified version of this
relative histogram due to our mechanism is denoted
by p′. We have represented this profile by assuming
that all users apply a common message-deferral rate.
Not entirely unexpectedly, Fig. 14(a) shows that the
time slots most affected by our PET are those with
the lowest and highest activity. This is the case of the
intervals 5, 6, 7 and 8 on the one hand, and 15, 16,
17, 18 and 19 on the other. For this relatively small
value of deferral rate, the number of messages posted
between 6 a.m. and 7 a.m. is increased by 44.68%,
whereas the amount of messages sent between 16 p.m.
and 17 p.m. is reduced by 12.50%. In Fig. 14(d), ϕ '
0.4844 and the overall profile of activity p′ becomes
nearly uniform. In this last case, the largest increase
in the number of tweets is observed for the time slot 7,
while the largest reduction in the number of tweets is
spotted for the time period 17. In particular, in those
time intervals we observe an increase and a reduction
of 106.03% and 32.65%, respectively. In summary,
should our data set be representative of the whole
population of Twitter users, the extensive application
of the proposed PET could reduce substantially the
number of networking resources and maximize the
efficiency of such resources.
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Motivated by the lack of previous works specifically
addressing the threat of time profiling in social net-
works, as well as the danger that such type of attack
entails, the paper at hand presents an optimized,
delay-based mechanism. This approach consists in
an intelligent delay of a given number of messages
posted by users in social networks in a manner that
the observed profiles generated by the attacker do not
break the privacy of those users. In other words, the
attacker is unable to infer any time-based sensitive
information by just observing and logging the times-
tamp of each interaction of the end users with the
social networking sites.
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Fig. 14: Relative histogram of the tweets in our data set within one day. We denote this histogram as p. As a consequence of the optimized
deferral of those tweets, the profile p results in the modified profile p′.
Moreover, a detailed architecture implementing this
mechanism has been described and analyzed, show-
ing the feasibility of our proposal. Yet, any PET
comes at the cost of certain utility loss. Hence, we
have studied two meaningful utility metrics specific
for our smart deferral mechanism (both in terms of
the message deferral rate), namely: expected message
delay and messages storage capacity. As shown, both
metrics exhibit an increasing, nonlinear behavior with
regards to the deferral rate. When the critical deferral
rate (beyond which the maximum level of privacy is
attained) is known, those outcomes become remark-
ably helpful to assess the optimal capacity for the
messages buffer, as well as the average expected delay
of each message in the system.
Finally, a comprehensive set of experiments has
been conducted on three of the most popular social
networks, Facebook, Instagram and Twitter, analyz-
ing the behavior of 1 283 users, demonstrating the
suitability of our solution and comparing it with two
data-perturbative privacy technologies. In particular,
it has been proved that most of the studied users
will not require delaying a large percentage of their
tweets for their apparent profiles to become the uni-
form distribution. Likewise, users in our data set will
require relatively small margins of privacy gain to
achieve the critical-privacy level. Another interesting
conclusion states that our approach may help social
networking sites manage their networking resources
more efficiently, as it contributes to distribute the
traffic load evenly. Furthermore, the mean values for
the messages expected delay and messages storage
capacity in our experiments, respectively, was 3.89
hours and 31.24% of users’ messages.
As for the future research lines derived from this
work, we are investigating some of the assumptions
made in this work. Thus for instance, since we ac-
knowledge that the user activity may vary signifi-
cantly over time, we need to consider this fact in order
to periodically update users’ profiles. In the same di-
rection, we want to study the bootstrapping problem,
i.e., how to define users’ profiles when the system
is launched for the first time, or while the system is
learning the actual users’ profiles. Last but not least,
we also aim at investigating the challenges derived
from deploying and implementing our solution over
a real environment, such as those related to the fact
that users may in fact exhibit activity profiles with
specific active time periods.
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